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This article challenges the methodological nationalism of the convergence debate by 
arguing that multilevel governance destabilizes the coalitions thought to underpin lib-
eral and coordinated varieties of capitalism. Existing efforts to explain how coherent 
production regimes emerge and persist assume that some dominant social bloc ensures 
coherence by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory subspheres. This as-
sumption is not tenable in systems of multilevel governance. Three features of multi-
level governance diminish the scope for a uniform social bloc to ensure a tight coupling 
of complementary regulations. First, the strategic opportunities for playing multilevel 
games vary across regulatory subspheres. Second, willingness to exploit these oppor-
tunities varies, because the transnational scope of legislation adds a “constrain-com-
petitor” dimension to actors’ decision-making that may either strengthen or weaken 
interest group cohesion. Third, the institutional set-up at the supranational level of 
Europe’s multilevel polity multiplies alignment options. To illustrate these claims, the 
article draws on case studies of EU company law initiatives concerning takeovers and 
worker participation.
Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Aufsatz wendet sich gegen den in der Konvergenzdebatte vorherr-
schenden methodologischen Nationalismus, indem er aufzeigt, dass Koalitionsbildung 
in Mehrebenensystemen jene Koalitionen unterminiert, die gemeinhin als Stützen der 
liberalen und koordinierten Spielarten des Kapitalismus gelten. Versuche zu erklären, 
wie kohärente Produktionsregime entstehen und fortbestehen, gehen bisher davon 
aus, dass ein dominanter sozialer Block seine Interessen in allen relevanten regulativen 
Teilbereichen durchsetzt. Diese Annahme ist für politische Mehrebenensysteme nicht 
haltbar. Drei Aspekte von Mehrebenenpolitik verringern die Möglichkeiten eines do-
minanten sozialen Blocks, komplementäre Regulierungen eng zu verknüpfen. Erstens 
unterscheidet sich der Spielraum für strategische Mehrebenenspiele in den einzelnen 
Teilbereichen kohärenter Produktionsregime. Zweitens unterscheidet sich die Bereit-
schaft zur Ausnutzung dieses Spielraums, weil die transnationale Reichweite von Geset-
zen dem Entscheidungskalkül von Akteuren eine „Constrain-Competitor“-Dimension 
hinzufügt, die den grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenhalt von Interessengruppen ent-
weder stärkt oder schwächt. Drittens erweitert das Institutionsgefüge auf der europä-
ischen Ebene die Vielfalt der Koalitionsmöglichkeiten. Fallstudien zu EU-Richtlinien 
zur Regelung von Unternehmensübernahmen und betrieblicher Mitbestimmung ver-
anschaulichen diese Thesen.
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1 Introduction
“Capitalism vs. capitalism” – some fifteen years ago, an airport bestseller caused a stir 
by noting that the “battle of the systems” had not ended with the demise of socialism. 
The post-Cold War world, it claimed, was not left with a single unambiguous answer to 
the question of economic organization, but with “two opposing models of capitalism 
locked in a conflict whose outcome is far from certain.” By highlighting the diversity of 
modern capitalist economies, Albert (1993: 14) popularized what political economists 
had been arguing for decades, starting with Shonfield’s (1965) path-breaking treatise. 
Today, most scholarship in comparative political economy is devoted to identifying, 
classifying, examining the effects of, and explaining differences in the institutional ar-
rangements of capitalist countries.
Because people care about the chances for the survival and spread of their preferred 
variety of capitalism, there has been much debate on whether intensified global com-
petition on capital and product markets will force all countries to converge on a single 
model. For some time, this debate focused on whether there is a unique most competi-
tive set of institutional arrangements. Believers in a unique best model argued that di-
versity would end once market pressures became strong enough to ensure that only the 
fittest companies survive (e.g. Hansmann/Kraakman 2001). Believers in multiple roads 
to competitiveness questioned the inevitability of market-driven convergence. Assum-
ing that different models equip firms to perform better at some activities and worse 
at others, they argued that growing international trade might even increase diversity 
by encouraging a global division of labor (e.g. Porter 1990; Hall/Soskice 2001). More 
recently, the debate has moved on to recognize that the battle of the systems is fought 
in the political as well as in the economic realm, over distributional as well as efficiency 
matters (see, for example, Hancké/Rhodes/Thatcher 2007). To gage the prospects for 
continued capitalist diversity, it is not enough to establish whether different models are 
capable of holding their ground in a Darwinian struggle for economic survival, because 
alternative roads to economic competitiveness may not be equally viable politically. For 
diversity to persist, the political battle will need to keep playing out differently across 
countries. 
The present article contributes to this debate by discussing how the increasing salience 
of the European Union as a transnational political arena affects the clash of capitalisms. 
It bridges the literatures on Europeanization (e.g. Risse/Cowles/Caporaso 2001; Héritier 
et al. 2001) and Varieties of Capitalism (e.g. Hall/Soskice 2001), which are still disjoint 
despite their common focus on convergence. Research in the Varieties of Capitalism tra-
dition, concerned with examining whether distinct national varieties of capitalism can 
withstand the economic pressures resulting from globalization, has neglected the politi-
cal pressures for convergence that emanate from Europe. Research on Europeanization, 
Thanks go to Martin Höpner, Armin Schäfer, and Guido Tiemann for their helpful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper. 
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which does emphasize political, EU-induced convergence pressures, has neglected key 
battlegrounds in the clash of capitalisms. Menz (2005) and Schmidt (2002) are notable 
exceptions.
Existing work mostly suggests that European political integration favors market-orient-
ed models of capitalism. Scharpf (1999, 2007: 13) emphasizes the bias towards “nega-
tive” integration produced by the asymmetric reach of judicial power: The European 
Court of Justice can strike down national regulations that impede the free movement of 
goods, services, and people, to which EU governments are committed by treaty; it can-
not step in to re-regulate at the European level. Streeck (2001) warns that the reduced 
capacity of national governments to impose “beneficial constraints” threatens non-lib-
eral forms of capitalism. Offe (2005: 154) suggests that “embeddedness” may be more 
easily lost than gained, “in much the same way as, to quote Walensa, it is easier to make 
fish soup out of an aquarium than the other way around.” Schmitter and Streeck (1991) 
explain why labor finds it more difficult than capital to get its way at the European level. 
Höpner and Schäfer (2007) claim that recent policy initiatives by the European Com-
mission systematically target the institutions of organized capitalism.
My article challenges this view by arguing that multilevel governance affects preferences 
and cleavage patterns in ways that threaten to undermine both liberal and coordinated 
varieties of capitalism. Three separate mechanisms are at work. First, the strategic op-
portunities for playing multilevel games vary across the separate components of coher-
ent production regimes, depending on the distance of EU proposals from the domestic 
status quo. Second, the willingness to exploit these opportunities varies, because the 
transnational scope of EU legislation adds a new dimension to actors’ decision-making 
problem, which I label the “constrain-competitor effect” of legislation. Laws passed at 
the European level apply throughout the European Community, and people take this 
into account when they try to decide whether or not they like a legislative proposal. 
The value of constraining competitors influences cleavage patterns. Negative constrain-
competitor effects strengthen transnational interest group cohesion, while positive con-
strain-competitor effects undermine it. Third, the institutional set-up at the EU level 
of Europe’s multilevel polity facilitates the simultaneous advancement of mutually in-
compatible reforms. Multiplication of alignment patterns makes it more difficult for a 
dominant social block to impose its preferences across all the regulatory subspheres of 
coherent production regimes. The battle of the systems currently fought in the Euro-
pean political arena is therefore likely to produce neither convergence nor continued 
coexistence but hybrid models combining elements of both.
The article proceeds as follows: Section two introduces the concepts of coherence and 
institutional complementarity and situates them within the convergence debate. For the 
sake of concreteness, I focus on rules concerning takeovers and worker participation as 
key elements of the institutional infrastructure that distinguishes coherent models of 
capitalism (see Vitols 2001; Höpner 2005). Section three explains why multilevel govern-
ance diminishes the scope for a dominant social block to ensure coherence by imposing 
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its interests across all relevant subspheres. The final section concludes by drawing out 
the implications of my argument for debates on multilevel governance, economic per-
formance and institutional change. 
2 Background: Institutional complementarity and dominant social blocks
Corporate governance – the division of power inside companies between workers, man-
agers, and owners – varies across advanced capitalist economies. Decades of scholarship 
on comparative capitalism have yielded a vast range of typologies and labels, but most 
authors distinguish dichotomously between shareholder-oriented and stakeholder-ori-
ented models. The shareholder model makes managers accountable only to sharehold-
ers and relies on market mechanisms to address principal–agent problems. It features 
takeover rules that promote active markets for corporate control by eliminating barriers 
to hostile bids. The stakeholder model makes managers accountable not just to share-
holders but also to employees. It relies mainly on company-internal monitoring devices 
to keep managers in check. Mandatory worker participation provides employees with 
voice both at the company board level and on the shop floor (Woolcock 1996; Vitols 
2001). 
Corporate governance is politically contentious because of its distributional implica-
tions. Not only do workers have less voice in shareholder systems, but the share of na-
tional income accruing to labor as opposed to capital is lower, and there is greater income 
inequality between the managers of corporations and the remainder of the workforce 
(de Jong 1996; Coffee 2005: 203; Pendleton/Gospel 2005: 66 –69). The perceived fairness 
of alternative distributional outcomes hinges on one’s ideological stance on property 
rights in the firm. Advocates of the shareholder model view shareholders as the sole 
risk bearers and thus as legitimate claimants to the entire residual value of the firm after 
contractual payments have been made. Advocates of the stakeholder model argue that 
employees making non-transferable, firm-specific investments in human capital bear 
risks not covered by their contracts and therefore “have as much claim to being owners 
of the corporation as do shareholders, and perhaps more so” (Blair 1995: 239).
However, the political economy literature has also identified efficiency implications as 
a less normatively charged reason to care about the choice of model. According to the 
theory of comparative institutional advantage, different models favor different produc-
tion strategies. The stakeholder model is thought to support strategies that rely on well-
trained workforces with specialist, firm-specific skills and on stable long-term supplier 
relationships – strategies typically characterized by incremental innovation and “diver-
sified quality production” (see Streeck 1991). Examples are high-quality, engineering-
intensive industries such as advanced machine tools, luxury automobiles, or specialty 
chemicals. The shareholder model is thought to support strategies that depend on ven-
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ture capital and/or flexibility to hire and fire. Examples include products and services 
requiring radical innovation, such as certain segments of the software, biotech, and 
financial services industries, or mass products that compete on price rather than quality 
and require a ready supply of cheap, unskilled labor (Hall/Soskice 2001: 36–44). 
For the purposes of the present article, it is important to note that the models of capi-
talism thought to generate comparative institutional advantage are not just random 
configurations of rules but display what political economists call institutional comple-
mentarities (see Aoki 1994). Some combinations of rules are considered more efficient 
than others, because they interact to jointly provide the incentives and constraints that 
are required for the achievement of comparative institutional advantage. For example, 
workers have greater incentives to invest in the company-specific skills required for di-
versified quality production where the financial system shield companies from share-
holder demands for short term profits, because this allows firms to maintain skilled 
workers during economic downturns. Patient capital in turn requires stable labor rela-
tions. Conversely, short-term finance, which requires quick entry and exit from busi-
ness activities, is supported by industrial relations systems that allow inexpensive hir-
ing and firing. Given the importance of complementarity in the theory of comparative 
institutional advantage, gaging the survival prospects of coherent models of capitalism 
in the European political arena requires forecasting not just whether governments will 
continue to support different rules, but whether they will continue to support combina-
tions of rules that complement each other. 
The sources of institutional complementarity have only recently become a subject of re-
search (cf. Höpner 2005; Shalev 2001). As Crouch (2005: 23) observes, characteristics of 
economies are still all too often “bundled together as coherent wholes with inadequate 
attention being paid to the forces which produce the bundles.” The surge in interest 
stems from growing dissatisfaction with functionalist explanations. The theory of com-
parative institutional advantage provides a reason why governments exposed to strong 
international competition ought to resist convergence on a single set of rules. By cater-
ing optimally to a subset of all conceivable production strategies, countries can provide 
firms engaging in these strategies with a competitive edge in world markets. Mutual 
gains from trade can allow nations to “prosper not by becoming more similar, but by 
building on their institutional differences” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 60). Nevertheless, like 
other functionalist arguments, comparative institutional advantage is unsatisfactory as 
an explanation for persistent cross-national convergence because, as Hall and Soskice 
(2001: 52) note themselves, regulatory action by governments is often “motivated by 
considerations going well beyond efficiency.” What, then, “makes for the internal co-
herences, or consistency, of national models … given that institutional change is not 
normally driven by a societal master plan” (Streeck 2001: 37)?
Efforts to provide actor-centered explanations have produced widespread agreement 
that coherent models of capitalism owe their existence to some dominant social bloc 
whose interests systematically prevail across policy spheres. Complementarities are 
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thought to arise because “actors whose interests are served well by a particular set of 
industrial-relations institutions … have an interest in seeing complementary institu-
tions maintained in the sphere of corporate governance or product markets” (Hall/Sos-
kice forthcoming). Different perspectives disagree only on the identity and motivations 
of this bloc. In the power resource literature, the dominant social bloc is either capital 
or labor, depending on the relative power resources available to these groups in differ-
ent national political settings (Korpi 1983, 2006; Stephens 1979). Employer-centered 
approaches maintain that capital gets its way in all advanced industrial democracies, 
and that different models persist because employer preferences differ across countries 
(Swenson 2002; Mares 2003). Some authors point to political forces outside the class 
nexus, such as conservative parties and state traditions shaped by religious influences 
(van Kersbergen 1995). Others emphasize the “historical role of the state in fighting 
disintegrative tensions and tendencies toward ‘regime incoherence’ by authoritatively 
imposing obligations on market participants” (Streeck 2001: 37). Regarding the moti-
vations, some authors suspect institutional engineering, suggesting that actors inten-
tionally “foster the development of institutions complementary to those already present 
in the economy in order to secure the efficiency gains they provide” (Hall/Soskice 2001: 
18). Others see institutional complementarity as an unintentional by-product of iso-
morphic choices (e.g. Kitschelt/Streeck 2003: 3). While disagreeing over the identity and 
motivations of the dominant bloc, these different perspectives concur that the separate 
components of coherent models are chosen by a single set of actors. 
The role of a dominant social bloc in creating and maintaining institutional comple-
mentarity implies that coherent models of capitalism are more fragile than static equi-
librium analyses suggest. Hall and Soskice (2001) received much criticism for failing to 
elaborate why countries would ever move away from a position of comparative institu-
tional advantage (e.g. Hay 2005: 106; Blyth 2003; Howell 2003). As Thelen (2004: 287) 
observes, institutional stability requires “a high degree of continuity in who the power-
ful agents are, both across various institutional arenas and over time.” Amable (cited in 
Crouch et al. 2005: 372) warns that “a changing environment may modify the strategies 
of the groups that form the dominant bloc, which in turn may lead to a restructuring 
or breaking-up of the bloc.” 
The following section examines these concerns in the context of European integration. 
I argue that multilevel governance reduces the scope for a uniform social bloc to domi-
nate policy-making. This may precipitate a decoupling of the separate components that 
together form coherent models of capitalism.
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3 How multilevel governance affects the clash of capitalisms
The term multilevel governance describes the dispersion of power away from national 
governments, both upward to the supranational level and downward to the subnation-
al level of provincial, state, and municipal governments. It contains both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions. While ‘multilevel’ refers to the proliferation of territorial lay-
ers, ‘governance’ signals the growing interdependence between governments and non-
governmental actors (cf. Bache/Flinders 2004: 3). Widely studied in the context of Eu-
ropean integration (e.g. Scharpf 1994; Hooghe/Marks 2001), the phenomenon is also 
familiar to political economists and critical geographers, sometimes under alternative 
labels such as ‘multi-tiered governance’, ‘rescaling’ or ‘glocalization’ (see Harmes 2006: 
725–726; Marks/Hooghe 2003).
So far, research on the implications of multilevel governance for economic policy-mak-
ing has focused on shifts in power that result from new strategic opportunities for play-
ing off different levels against each other. Putnam’s (1988) seminal article on two-level 
games in particular has inspired much theoretical work in this direction. According to 
Putnam, clever players in multilevel settings will “spot a move on one board that will 
trigger alignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unobtainable 
objectives” (1988: 434). Whether these strategic opportunities strengthen or weaken 
national governments vis-à-vis non-governmental actors has been subject to lively 
debate. Marks and Hooghe emphasize the opportunities for interest groups to bypass 
their national governments by lobbying the European Commission to promote change 
at home. Moravcsik (1997) counters that multilevel governance strengthens the state by 
reallocating important power resources in favor of national executives. Other authors 
formally model situations in which multilevel governance serves to increase leverage 
in either international or domestic negotiations1 (Fearon 1994; Schneider/Cederman 
1994; Mo 1995; Pahre/Papayoanou 1997). 
Unnoticed by this literature, multilevel governance affects not just the direction, but 
also the coherence of economic policy. Three distinct aspects of multilevel governance 
contribute to reducing the scope for a homogenous social bloc to impose its preferences 
across all the separate subspheres that together form coherent models of capitalism. 
First, the strategic opportunities for using the European level of policy-making as part 
of a multilevel game to change legislation at the domestic level vary across subspheres. 
It depends on whether domestic requirements exceed or fall short of proposed EU leg-
islation. Directives, the favored legislative instrument at the EU level, only set minimum 
standards and leave national legislators to fill in the details. As a result, multilevel gov-
ernance can help introduce new stakeholder-friendly legislation into Britain’s liberal 
1 This idea goes back to Schelling’s “paradox of weakness.” Schelling remarks that “the power to 
constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself; that, in bargaining, weakness 
is often strength, freedom may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may 
suffice to undo an opponent” (Schelling 1960: 22).
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market economy and new shareholder-friendly legislation into Germany’s coordinated 
market economy, but it cannot help with removing existing shareholder-friendly or 
stakeholder-friendly legislation because national governments can choose to maintain 
stricter requirements than those laid down by the EU.
Second, the willingness of interest groups to exploit the strategic opportunities associ-
ated with multilevel governance varies across the separate subspheres of coherent mod-
els of capitalism. The European scope of legislation adds a new dimension to actors’ 
decision-making problem, which I label the “constrain-competitor effect” of legisla-
tion. Laws passed at the European level apply throughout the European Community, 
and people take this into account when they try to decide whether or not they like a 
legislative proposal. Apart from considering whether they are better or worse off if they 
themselves are subjected to a European law, they also consider how it affects them that 
the same law will apply abroad. The value of constraining competitors influences cleav-
age patterns. Where the constrain-competitor effect is negative, class cohesion is rein-
forced, inducing workers and employers to join transnational coalitions with their peers 
abroad. Where the constrain-competitor effect is positive, transnational class cohesion 
is weakened, and cross-class coalitions between workers and employers embedded in 
the same production regime are more likely.
Third, and specific to the EU, the current institutional set-up at the supranational level 
of Europe’s multilevel polity allows competing coalitions to simultaneously advance 
mutually incompatible reforms. The European Commission is ideologically more het-
erogeneous than most national administrations because its members are appointed by 
the governments of member states. As a result, reform efforts regarding the separate 
regulatory subspheres of coherent production regimes are more likely to be inspired 
by conflicting ideologies and interests. In the Council of Ministers, qualified majority 
voting (QMV) can force governments to adopt EU legislation that is not endorsed by 
a political majority in their own country. It thereby reduces the scope for actors at the 
national level to safeguard the regulatory coherence of their production regime. At the 
same time, QMV discourages the formation of a dominant bloc capable of imposing 
coherence at the European level. Winning coalitions in the Council of Ministers would 
almost inevitably continue to differ across regulatory subspheres even if QMV were 
to replace national vetoes on all issues, because the currently 25 member states of the 
European Union do not all fall neatly into the two broad categories that dominate the 
Varieties of Capitalism literature. 
Barring other yet-to-be-identified sources of coherence, the reduced scope for a homoge-
nous social bloc to dominate policy-making threatens both liberal and coordinated va-
rieties of capitalism. Variation in the size and composition of support coalitions implies 
that the rules governing different subspheres differ in their vulnerability to shifts in the 
balance of political power. Where broad cross-class coalitions support a rule, govern-
ment positions should remain relatively unresponsive, because parties representing dif-
ferent clienteles will support similar policies. Where the support coalition is less broad, 
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a change in government is more likely to bring about policy change. In other words, 
“tight coupling” by virtue of a dominant social bloc does not work under conditions 
of multilevel governance. Whether it ever was the main source of institutional comple-
mentarity remains to be established. If it was, as most authors still assume, then Euro-
pean integration will precipitate the disintegration of coherent models of capitalism. 
To illustrate how multilevel governance affects actors’ opportunities to promote com-
peting visions of capitalism across regulatory subspheres, the following section docu-
ments the support coalitions underpinning EU legislative proposals regarding takeovers 
and worker participation from 1970 onward. 
4 Case study: EU company law harmonization
EU company law harmonization provides occasion for political actors of all ideologi-
cal persuasions to intervene in the battle of the systems on behalf of their preferred 
variety of capitalism. Since the establishment of the European Economic Community 
in 1957, the European Commission has the authority to interfere with the national laws 
of member states “to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common 
market” (Art. 3 h EEC). The case for EU intervention in company law is relatively un-
controversial despite competing views on what it means for the market to function 
properly and how this goal is best achieved. “Neoliberals” see it as a means of removing 
obstacles to the free play of market forces by facilitating cross-border business ventures, 
while “transnational social democrats”2 see it as a means of preventing a race to the 
bottom where governments outbid each other in their efforts to cut back standards to 
attract footloose investors. But while both camps favor some legislative convergence, 
their respective preferred outcomes are inspired by different models of capitalism. The 
possibility of EU intervention thus brings the battle of the systems into the European 
political arena.
So far, the European Commission’s efforts to promote company law harmonization 
have enjoyed only limited success. More than thirty years after the first EU company law 
proposals, EU member states are still far from agreeing on rules that affect the influence 
of shareholders and workers on managerial decisions. The EU Takeover Directive, ad-
opted in December 2003, left so much discretion to national governments that Internal 
Market Commissioner Bolkestein judged it “not worth the paper it was written on.”3 
More ambitious drafts of the directive had encountered insurmountable resistance in 
1974, 1994, and 2001. Disagreement over worker participation rights at board level or 
on the shop floor prevented adoption of the Fifth Company Law Directive (1972 and 
2 The labels are borrowed from Apeldoorn (2000).
3 Financial Times Deutschland, December 17, 2003, p. 30.
Callaghan: How Multilevel Governance Affects the Clash of Capitalisms 13
1983), the so-called Vredeling Directive (1980 and 1983), and several drafts for a Eu-
ropean Company Statute (1970, 1975, 1989, and 1991). The European Works Councils 
Directive (1994) and the Information and Consultation Directive (2001) were passed 
only after Britain had negotiated special concessions. 
Nevertheless, the struggle over these directives illustrates the difficulties for a uniform 
social bloc to ensure a tight coupling of complementary regulations in settings of mul-
tilevel governance. First, the strategic opportunities for using the European level of 
policy-making as part of a multilevel game to change legislation at the domestic level 
varied across subspheres. The EU worker participation directives helped British unions 
obtain more participation rights than they could have achieved in a purely domestic 
game. Britain’s opt-opt from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty did not ex-
empt British multinationals from the requirement to set up European works councils 
for staff in their non-British subsidiaries. Due to the practical difficulties of excluding 
their British workers from these bodies, more than 90 percent of the companies con-
cerned ended up implementing “voluntarily” what they and their government had bit-
terly opposed (Clement 1996; Lorenz/Smith 1994). The Information and Consultation 
Directive, passed in 2001, is another example of a small step towards hybridization of 
the shareholder model that would have been inconceivable in a purely domestic game. 
The directive, which mandates a minimal degree of worker participation in all British 
companies with more than 50 employees, was opposed not just by employers but also 
by the British government. Within weeks of his election as Prime Minister, Tony Blair 
warned the European Commission not to use Labour party support for EU social provi-
sions as an excuse for advancing a raft of laws adding to business costs and stifling job 
creation. Blair’s government strongly opposed the Information and Consultation Di-
rective, which it saw as unnecessary and inconsistent with the principle of subsidiarity.4 
Peter Mandelson, trade and industry secretary, warned that the directive would threat-
en competitiveness, slow down corporate decisions and strengthen the trade unions.5 
 British opposition was not sustainable indefinitely because the Information and Con-
sultation Directive was subject to qualified majority voting. Blair finally signed in June 
2001 – within days of his second election victory – after negotiating some minor con-
cessions for British companies.6 Similarly, EU takeover directives provided shareholders 
of German companies with a means of pushing for greater shareholder protection than 
they would have been able to obtain in a purely domestic game. If two British MEPs had 
not arrived late for the final vote on 4 July 2001, the shareholder-oriented Takeover Di-
rective would have passed without approval from the German government and against 
the united opposition of German delegates across all parties in the European Parlia-
ment (Callaghan/Höpner 2005). However, while multilevel governance can thus help 
introduce new stakeholder-friendly legislation into Britain’s liberal market economy 
4 Press Association, March 16, 1998 and October 16, 1998.
5 Financial Times, December 1, 1998, p. 15.
6 In the UK, the directive applies since 2008 to employers with 50 or more staff. In the rest of the 
EU, the directive since from 2005 to employers with 20 or more staff. 
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and new shareholder-friendly legislation into Germany’s coordinated market economy, 
it cannot help with removing existing shareholder or stakeholder-friendly legislation. 
German employers cannot achieve a reduction in worker participation requirements 
within Germany by fighting the EU worker participation directives. Likewise, British 
workers do not gain better insulation from hostile bids by fighting the EU takeover 
directives. In both cases, national governments can choose to maintain stricter require-
ments than those laid down by the EU.
Second, the willingness of interest groups to exploit the strategic opportunities associ-
ated with multilevel governance varied across subspheres. German and British employ-
ers were deeply divided over EU proposals concerning takeover bids. British employers 
gave “strong support to Commission initiatives which aim to remove structural barriers 
to contested takeovers in the EC,” urging their government to “put its weight behind the 
draft Directive on Takeovers … [which] will give a degree of harmonization of share-
holders’ rights and put some restraints on defensive measures available to boards” (CBI 
1989). German employers failed to see “the slightest need for such a directive” and “em-
phatically reject[ed]” EU efforts to promote shareholder primacy in takeover situations. 
By contrast, German and British employers united against the EU worker participation 
initiatives. During the 1970s, they fought the provisions for board level participation in 
the European Company Statute and the Fifth Company Law Directive. During the early 
1980s, “the rejection of the [Vredeling] directive proposal by European Trade [was] 
both unanimous and decisive” (BDA/BDI 1983a). During the early 1990s, employers 
in both countries rejected European works councils as cumbersome, bureaucratic and 
expensive (BDA/BDI 1991; BDI 1994; CBI 1991). During the late 1990s, the Informa-
tion and Consultation Directive came under concerted employer attack. “In agreement 
with the European industrial and employer associations in the framework of UNICE, 
[German employers] reject[ed] a directive of this sort” (BDA 1998).
The opposite direction of the constrain-competitor effects helps explain why cleavage 
patterns varied. As noted by the German peak employer federation, “the consequences 
of the proposed rules for employers in other member states are also relevant from a Ger-
man perspective and must not be ignored” (BDA/BDI 1983b). In the case of the takeover 
directives, a positive constrain-competitor effect undermined transnational cohesion. 
Managers like seeing their competitors defenseless, and this created divisions inside the 
European peak federation between employers on opposite sides of the non-level playing 
field. British employers wanted to end a situation where  “successful British businesses 
can be hijacked by Europeans with bullet-proof waistcoats,’’7 while German employers 
saw  “no reason why a situation which has proved satisfactory in the past, and which has 
developed without any formal harmonization, should give rise to problems in the fu-
ture” (BDI 1987). In the case of the worker participation directives, negative constrain-
competitor effects strengthened transnational cohesion. German employers thought 
that they would be worse off if the rules binding them were spread across Europe:
7 The Independent, February 22, 1990, p. 32.
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If the imposition of those extensive worker participation rules … causes friction and a decline 
in company performance [in other EU member states], then this could only myopically be re-
garded as a competitive advantage for German companies. In actual fact, it would be a loss of 
competitiveness for the Common Market as a whole, which would be cause for concern also 
from a German point of view. (BDA/BDI 1983b)
Among other things, they warned that EU worker participation directives would “pro-
vide employees with much leeway to make demands beyond the rules contained in 
the directive proposal and in the German Works Constitution Act” (BDA 1998), that 
“implementation of the directive proposal would [not] be possible without the dispute 
on co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany being rekindled with all its 
bitterness” (BDA/BDI 1983a), and that “a binding legal instrument in the EC would 
prejudice the treatment of the issue area ‘transnational enterprise’ by other interna-
tional institutions” (BDA/BDI 1981).
Third, the fact that directives on takeovers and worker participation could be promoted 
side by side shows that the current institutional set-up of Europe’s multilevel polity 
allows for the simultaneous advancement of contradictory reforms. Directives con-
cerning these issues were underpinned by different normative conceptions of property 
rights in the firm and rival projects for European integration. The draft takeover direc-
tives sought to strengthen the rights of shareholders vis-à-vis stakeholders and remove 
barriers to the market for corporate control. From the outset, the British City code – the 
world’s most shareholder-oriented set of takeover rules – served as the blueprint for 
drafts of the EU takeover directives (see Callaghan 2006: 38-43). A declared aim was 
“harmonization conducive to corporate restructuring” (CEC 2002). As Internal Market 
Commissioner Bangemann explained, takeover bids were seen “in a positive light in 
that they encourage the selection by market forces of the most competitive companies 
and the restructuring of European companies which is indispensable to meet inter-
national competition.”8 His successor, Internal Market Commissioner Frits Bolkestein, 
explicitly rejected the “Rhenish model of capitalism, where stakeholders are pampered 
instead of shareholders, and where consultations take place on numerous round tables.” 
He insisted that, “if Europe really wants to become the most competitive and most 
modern economic area, it must leave the comfortable setting of the Rhenish model and 
subject itself to the harsher conditions of the Anglo-Saxon form of capitalism, where 
the rewards, but also the risks, are higher.”9 By contrast, the worker participation direc-
tives sought to strengthen the rights of stakeholders vis-à-vis shareholders by deploying 
politics against markets. The preambles to the directives emphasize that “[t]oo great 
a divergence in the laws regulating the role of employees in relation to the decision-
making structures of companies constitutes not only a barrier to cross-frontier move-
ments of companies, capital and employees, but, more fundamentally, it is also a denial 
of the idea of a Community as far as employees are concerned” (CEC 1975). They insist 
that “further development of the Internal Market must be properly balanced, maintain-
8 M&A Europe, May/June 1990, p. 35.
9 Neue Züricher Zeitung, November 9, 2002.
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ing the essential values on which our societies are based and ensuring that all citizens 
benefit from economic development” (CEC 1999) and that “the development of big 
transnational companies promoted by the Single Market requires enhanced dialogue 
between management and employees in these companies if this development is to take 
place in a harmonious fashion” (1994 EWC Directive, cited in Knutsen 1997). 
By itself, this simultaneous promotion of market-making and market-taming efforts is 
not a threat to the coherence of national varieties of capitalism, because the European 
Commission faces more institutional veto players than most national executives. As 
mentioned above, several draft directives concerning takeovers or worker participation 
were rejected either by the Council of Ministers or by the European Parliament, while 
others were passed only after amendments that rendered them worthless in the eyes of 
their initial advocates. However, Britain’s surrender to the EWC and Information and 
Consultation Directives as well as Germany’s narrow escape from the 2001 Takeover 
Directive show that the scenario of governments having to adopt legislation that is not 
endorsed by a political majority in their own country and may erode comparative insti-
tutional advantages is more than a remote hypothetical possibility. 
5 Conclusion
In sum, the present article challenges a fundamental premise of the convergence debate 
by highlighting how multilevel governance affects the clash of capitalisms. Existing ef-
forts to uncover the political underpinnings of institutional complementarities assume 
that some dominant social bloc ensures a tight coupling of the separate components of 
coherent production regimes by imposing its interests across all relevant regulatory 
subspheres. This premise suggests that change, if it occurs at all, will take the form of a 
switch from one coherent model to another. I argue that the premise does not hold in 
systems of multilevel governance. By reducing the scope for a uniform social bloc to 
dominate policy-making, multilevel governance precipitates a decoupling of the sepa-
rate components that together form coherent stakeholder-oriented or shareholder-ori-
ented models. 
I do not claim that European integration in general, or multilevel governance in par-
ticular, is causing the collapse of coherent production regimes that could otherwise 
survive. Several considerations preclude this line of argumentation. First, the threats 
to regime coherence posed by multilevel governance are amplified by other centrip-
etal pressures, including the differential impact of economic downturns and changes 
in ownership patterns on the coalitions supporting takeover rules and worker particip-
ation requirements. During economic downturns, the cross-class coalition against take-
over liberalization is strengthened, because foreign takeovers are more likely and any 
job cuts potentially associated with them are more painful. At the same time, class con-
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flict over worker participation intensifies as managers blame weak economic perform-
ance on their lack of flexibility. Changes in ownership patterns due to privatization or 
tax reforms are likely to affect the preference distribution more noticeably in the case 
of takeover rules than worker participation requirements. Ownership structure affects 
preferences with regard to takeover regulation because only companies with dispersed 
ownership are vulnerable to hostile bids and because ownership dispersion increases 
the number of minority shareholders and other groups who have an interest in active 
markets for corporate control. The effects of ownership structure on preferences to-
wards worker participation are less significant.
Second, it remains to be established whether a dominant social bloc did play a crucial 
role in the emergence of coherent production regimes even at the national level. Boy-
er and others argue that complementarity was never masterminded, either wittingly 
or unwittingly, and that, instead, it grew out of trial, error, and “muddling through” 
(see, for example, Boyer/Saillard 2002). Multilevel governance may therefore not be a 
necessary ingredient of hybridization. Streeck (2008: 29) explains the observed trend 
towards growing disorganization of the German political economy by pointing to the 
endogenous dynamics (Eigendynamik) of capitalism. Capitalist development is pre-
sented as inherently dialectical, driven by a fundamental conflict between market ex-
pansion and market containment. On this view, change in the separate subspheres 
that jointly constitute the German model, “while proceeding in the same direction, 
originated independently and endogenously, with no need for external destabilization” 
Streeck (2008: 100). 
Third, one could suggest, as Streeck (2008: 28) does, that endogenous institutional 
change, besides preceding internationalization, has significantly shaped its course. In 
other words, in the vein of intergovernmentalist accounts of European integration, the 
devolution of power to the EU level of Europe’s multilevel polity might have been less 
extensive if domestic actors had cared to maintain the coherence of their national pro-
duction regime. Multilevel governance, rather than causing change in preferences and 
coalitions, may merely reflect them. Such multiple and reciprocal causation poses prob-
lems for empirical research. Due to the small number of advanced capitalist democra-
cies, it is not possible to isolate the causal effect of multilevel governance by holding all 
other variables constant, and counterfactual cases are impossible to find. How would the 
German production regime evolve outside Europe’s system of multilevel governance? 
Comparison with Japan or with early post-war Germany can shed only limited light on 
this question. What can be safely said on the basis of analytic reasoning, however, is that 
multilevel governance adds to the centripetal pressures on coherent production regimes 
– both of the liberal and organized varieties. The multiplication of alignment options 
makes it more difficult for a hegemonic class to form and impose a coherent blueprint. 
The battles currently fought out in the European political arena are therefore likely to 
produce neither knock-out nor continued co-existence of stakeholder capitalism and 
shareholder capitalism, but hybrid systems combining elements of both. 
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Is hybridization cause for concern? Answering this question requires determining 
whether hybrid systems mixing components of different models underperform pure 
models, or, as Crouch puts it, whether “pedigree dogs are better than mongrels” (Crouch 
2005: 48). This is difficult to ascertain empirically because many other factors influence 
macroeconomic performance and may compensate for underlying institutional mis-
match. The existing evidence is mixed and not robust to time periods and country clas-
sifications (cf. Jackson/Deeg 2006: 35). Hall and Gingerich (2004) find that economic 
performance positively correlates with the degree of a country’s inter-institutional co-
herence, while Kenworthy (2006) finds no correlation. Boyer (2004) identifies multiple 
institutional configurations conducive to economic growth. Recent theoretical advanc-
es suggest that hybridization may be less worrisome than Hall and Soskice (2001) sug-
gest. Crouch (2005: 55) draws out “advantages of the mongrel over the pedigree animal. 
The latter have heavily reinforced characteristics, which means that vulnerabilities are 
exaggerated, while the mongrel avoids such reinforcement and may therefore appear 
more balanced.” Among other advantages, hybrid systems may “facilitate innovation, 
both by presenting actors with alternative strategies when existing paths seem blocked 
and by making it possible for them to make new combinations among elements of vari-
ous paths” (Crouch 2005: 23). However, there is clearly a need to distinguish between 
resource-enriching heterogeneity and unhelpful incompatibility (cf. Crouch 2005: 59). 
Beyond the scope of the present article, this is a subject worth further research.
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